This study addresses the extension of the "procedural justice" model for understanding public cooperation with law enforcement to new policing contexts and new minority populations. The study draws on four recent surveys of public reactions to policing against crime or against terrorism across different populations to examine whether the changing purpose of policing, or changes in the communities targeted for heightened policing have an effect on how cooperative behaviors are elicited.
Introduction
Past decades have seen large advances in the understanding of public attitudes toward the police and of the determinants of public order. Methodologically diverse empirical studies have identified the importance of "procedural justice" mechanisms in shaping both compliance with the law (Tyler, 2006b (Tyler, , 2007 and cooperation with law enforcement (Tyler & Fagan, 2008) . That model emphasizes the value of engaging communities in efforts to manage crime. It suggests such engagement occurs to the greatest extent when the police exercise their authority through procedures evaluated as fair by those who experience them. The multiple data sets also enable comparative analysis of the effect on the majority of targeting a minority within the population. The procedural justice model suggests that people focus upon the fairness of policing procedures. Both policing against crime and policing against terror, however, involve a focus upon particular minority populations that are typically small in numbers and both economically and politically disadvantaged. Hence, an important issue in evaluating procedural justice models is whether the members of majority groups react negatively to unfair procedures directed at minority groups to which they do not belong. The nature and extent of such reactions may determine the sustainability of targeted policies that are experienced by minorities as unfair. This study examines this question by comparing two such situations: majority reactions to anti-crime policies directed toward African-Americans and Hispanics and to anti-terror policies directed at Muslim-Americans.
The study builds upon two prior investigations. First, Tyler and Fagan (2008) studied how different ethnic groups in New York evaluated policing tactics used against ordinary crime. Second, Tyler, Schulhofer and Huq (2010) explored the perception of counterterrorism policing tactics directed at Muslim Americans in New York. This study compares findings from these investigations with data from two additional surveys of (a) Muslims evaluating police efforts against ordinary crime and (b) non-Muslims evaluating police counterterrorism efforts.
Drawing on these four surveys, this study addresses three questions. First, does the procedural justice model effectively capture the dynamics of public responses to policing across populations and policing purposes? Ordinary crime and terrorism have different distributions of harm. They also lead to different distributions of policing resources across communities. By comparing populations it is possible to test the hypothesis that both those targeted by policing tactics and those who are not targeted react to policing by evaluating the procedural justice of police tactics. It is further possible to determine whether different evaluations of the harms caused by crime and terrorism lead to different public responses to police.
The second question is an extension of the first: Are the evaluations and actions of those who are not affected by policing tactics influenced by the manner in which the police treat members of other affected groups? Past studies of ordinary crime control have isolated a "spillover" effect from the procedural unjust treatment of minorities on to the perceptions and responses of majority community members (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004 ).
There is a question whether this spillover is observed in other policy areas and with respect to other minority groups.
Finally, the procedural justice model has identified various components of perceived police behavior that influence public responses to law enforcement. Earlier studies demonstrate that when people are dealing with legal authorities they consider different procedural elements to be important in the context of different kinds of interactions (Tyler, 1988) . In the case of conflict, "voice" is perceived as central to fair procedures for resolving conflicts. By contrast, "trust in the authority" matters the most when people ask an authority to solve a problem. Other studies comparing ethnic groups further suggest that while these groups all view procedural justice as important, they diverge in subtle ways in terms of which aspects of police behavior they use as metrics of procedural justice (Tyler, 2001 (Tyler, , 2005 Tyler & Huo, 2002) . This study extends the consideration of this issue by examining whether Muslim Americans judge procedural justice differently from previously studied ethnic groups. Although they are themselves ethnically and economically diverse, Muslims share a common religious background that may be distinct from the "Western" model broadly shared by White and minority group members in the United States.
I.
Policing and public cooperation: The "procedural justice" model and its alternatives
The "procedural justice" model of policing contends that people's reactions to law enforcement are shaped primarily by evaluations of the fairness of police conduct. In particular, people are concerned with whether decisions are made through fair procedures and whether people are treated in interpersonally fair ways during the decision-making process.
This model further proposes that procedural justice induces a belief in the legitimacy of the police, i.e. trust and confidence in the police and the view that they ought to be obeyed (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Lind & Tyler, 1998) . Legitimacy is "a belief" with behavioral consequences: It induces people to defer to authorities (Tyler,2006a) and engage in voluntary cooperation with the police (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, 2010) .
Proposed alternatives to the procedural justice model focus on instrumental judgments. In the case of ordinary crime, one alternative links reactions to the police to estimates of the ability of the police to identify and apprehend those who break the law, i.e., to a logic of deterrence. Another focuses upon the effectiveness of the police in managing crime and social order. In either case, to motivate public behavior the police need to achieve instrumental objectives. In the counterterrorism context, there are two relevant instrumental metrics: whether terrorism is perceived to be a serious problem, and whether the police are viewed as effective in managing terrorism risks.
Previous studies suggest that a procedural justice model explains public cooperation better than a model grounded on the view that people make cooperation judgments based on their views about the marginal expected costs or benefits of cooperation (Becker, 1976) .
Past empirical work also suggests the procedural justice model provides a powerful tool for describing the responses of both majority and minority groups (e.g., African-Americans, Hispanics) to ordinary crime (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006a; Tyler & Fagan; 2008) . A recent study of Muslim-Americans residing in New York City tested procedural justice accounts of cooperation against instrumental explanations that rely on calculations of costs and benefits (Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, 2010) . That study concluded that procedural justice shapes Muslim Americans' attitudes and behaviors toward counterterrorism policing both directly and also due to its influence on legitimacy beliefs. In contrast, the study found only weak support for instrumental mechanisms.
People did not cooperate based on whether they believed that the police were effective in dealing with terrorism either in terms of their ability of stop attacks. They also were not more likely to cooperate when they thought terrorism was a serious problem. Nor did the study find empirical support for the proposition that religious identity or experience in While these studies supported the application of the procedural justice model to terrorism, they did not systematically examine the influence of the nature of the policing task or the composition of the policed population on procedural justice assessments.
Further, the finding that Muslim Americans respond to procedural justice mechanisms does not mean that non-Muslims will respond in the same way in regard to counterterrorism policing. It is possible that non-Muslims will be less sensitive to procedural justice than Muslims in respect to policing against terrorism because the former are more likely to view terrorism as especially salient, harmful, or morally odious.
Alternatively, non-Muslims may discount the costs of counterterrorism because they believe the latter will be imposed disproportionately on a minority group of which they are not members. Early scholarly analyses predicted that the 9/11 attacks would lead to a loosening of constraints on investigative and prosecutorial powers and to a relaxation on legal prohibitions against racial and religious "profiling" (Stuntz, 2002) . While similar in some ways, public responses to post-9/11 policing strategies may diverge from pre-9/11 efforts at crime control for at least two reasons. Arabs. The study, however, did not address directly whether Jewish respondents viewed the police as less legitimate if they engaged in unfair tactics when dealing with Arabs.
IV. Summary
The studies presented address three questions. First, whether the procedural justice model applies across policing functions and policed populations. It is hypothesized the procedural justice will shape legitimacy and cooperation irrespective of variations in context. Second, whether the perception that another group is the target of disproportionate policing efforts has any effect on the cooperation behavior of a nontargeted population. In keeping with the theme that people care about justice it is predicted that when people believe there is injustice in policing it will lower legitimacy and undermine cooperation both when they personally experience such injustice and when they believe that the police treat other people and/or people in other groups unfairly. And third, whether people attend to different aspects of policing behavior if their community is targeted for heightened policing attention. It is hypothesized that, within the context of the United States, procedural justice/legitimacy will generally be defined in terms of similar procedural elements by respondents irrespective of context.
The four procedural elements shaping procedural justice are predicted to be: voice, neutrality, trust, and treatment with respect.
V. Method
To understand how policing policies and tactics influence public cooperation with law enforcement this paper analyzes the results of four post-9/11 surveys of the residents We believe that comparisons across surveys to be reasonable because all four surveys were conducted after September 2001 and because the terror-related surveys were conducted close in time. Further, the analysis here aims to evaluate the psychology of public behavior (and hence the relations between observed variables within a sample).
The analysis does not aim to estimate or compare the absolute value of public opinion within the population. Questions asked and scales formed are detailed in Appendix B.
Scale means and reliabilities are presented in Appendix C.
VI. Results
This section addresses three issues in turn. The first issue addressed is the psychology underlying public cooperation with efforts to combat ordinary crime: Does it make a different for public cooperation that the police are fighting terrorism rather than crime? We consider separately whether legitimacy effects and procedural justice effects are different in the crime control and counterterrorism contexts. The second issue is spillover effects: Does the perception of disparate treatment of a minority group consistently change the behavior of other minority and majority groups? The third issue concerns the determinants of procedural justice. If procedural justice mechanisms are observed across populations, is there nonetheless variation in the aspects of police behavior to which different populations look?
A. Legitimacy and cooperation
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is used to examine the role of three factors in shaping two kinds of cooperative behavior. The first form of cooperation involves the willingness to work with law enforcement in educating and encouraging other community members in the joint production of public safety. The second involves the willingness to report specific risks to the police.
Three independent variables were considered. These were legitimacy, the effectiveness of the police in addressing crime issues, and the ability of the police to catch and punish rule breakers.
The regression specification also included demographic parameters (age, education, income and gender). In the case of non-Muslims that sample distinguished between White and minority respondents. The larger sample on crime also distinguished between Hispanic and African-American respondents. Muslim sample asked about several background characteristics. Those were: the proportion of the respondent's life spend in the US; whether English was spoken in the respondent's home; Muslim identification; and whether the respondent came from either of two distinct regions:
South Asia or the Middle East. In each case, the analysis assessed whether these variables had a significant influence on the dependent variables. If so, they were included in the equation. Table 1 reports coefficients for the surveys on crime control. The results examine the factors shaping whether Muslim and non-Muslim respondents cooperated by alerting the police to crime issues and by cooperating in policing the community. Table 1 shows the results for white respondents (n = 550); for non-white respondents (n=1103); and for
Muslim respondents (n = 200).
[Insert Table 1 here]
The results shown in Table 1 suggest that legitimacy (the belief that the respondent should defer to legal authorities) was strongly positively correlated with both forms of cooperative behavior for all three groups (Muslim Americans, non-minority non-Muslims, and minority non-Muslims). For all three groups, legitimacy is more strongly related to cooperative behavior than were either estimates of police effectiveness or estimates of deterrence effects (i.e., the likelihood that police catch law breakers).
Deterrence effects were observed only for minority non-Muslims; but even for this population, legitimacy provided a more powerful explanation of cooperation.
Similar results are obtained in the case of anti-terror policing. Table 2 reports the results for non-Muslims (n = 200) and Muslims (n = 300) on counterterrorism.
Interestingly, none of the Muslim background variables influenced Muslim actions regarding terrorism, while demographics did influence the actions of non-Muslims.
For both groups, beliefs about legitimacy provided a powerful predictor of cooperative behavior. By contrast, the ability of police to induce feelings of safety had no correlation with cooperation within either group. For both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, instrumental factors were also important, albeit in different ways. In the case of non-Muslims the seriousness of terror mattered as much as legitimacy concerns. With
Muslims, judgments about police effectiveness appeared to shape willingness to alert the police.
[Insert Table 2 here]
B. Procedural justice and legitimacy
A second part of procedural justice models of policing is the effect of procedural justice considerations on legitimacy. This is addressed for policing against ordinary crime in Table 3 and for terrorism in Table 4 .
The findings are strongly supportive of the basic procedural justice model among all the groups studied. For all three populations studied, procedural justice in the implementation phase of policing is a powerful predictor of legitimacy judgments whether it concerns police crime-control or counterterrorism efforts. Previous studies of crime control have emphasized the relevance of how crime control is implemented on the ground. Table 4 shows that both studied populations also respond to the procedures through which policies are adopted.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]
C. Spillover effects
The second question focuses on spillover effects. Such effects would reflect concern by non-targeted populations about the actions of the police when dealing with the targeted population. Table 5 reports the effect on procedural justice and legitimacy judgments of beliefs that police engaged in crime control target minorities, act on the basis of racist motives, or harass minorities. The sample is broken into minority and White subgroups.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results indicate that White respondents view the police as less fair and less legitimate if they target minorities. The corrosive effect of this belief on majority legitimacy judgments is stronger if White respondents view that behavior as motivated by police prejudice and if White respondents believe that police are harassing minorities.
Can the same spillover effects be observed in counterterrorism policing? Table 6 reports a parallel analysis for the counterterrorism data. [Insert Tables 6 and 7 here]
As Table 7 . This shows that non-Muslims and Muslims have similar beliefs about the frequency and the intrusiveness of policing measures. Both sets of respondents indicated that similar levels of police intrusions were occurring. Both groups also linked public intrusions to unfairness and lower legitimacy. Neither group, however, viewed police intrusions that did not happen in public as undermining fairness or legitimacy.
These findings suggest that Muslims and non-Muslims have similar views about the frequency and intrusiveness of policing tactics. In this respect terrorism differs from crime since studies suggest that minority group members are more likely to believe that the police "racially profile" minorities (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004) . However, as noted, even in the case of crime, White respondents view profiling of minorities as unfair and, when they believe it occurs, view the police as less legitimate. This implies that spillover effects are likely to be more significant, all other things being equal, in the terrorism context, where non-minority beliefs of the frequency of profiling correlate with the beliefs of the minority.
D. The psychology of procedural justice
Finally, factors shaping judgments of procedural justice and legitimacy are considered. Since procedural justice and legitimacy were found to interrelate, the analysis uses a combined measure of procedural justice and legitimacy. Four procedural elements are considered as independent variables: voice; neutrality; trust, and respect. The results are shown in Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 here]
These results broadly suggest that three elements of procedure: neutrality; trust;
and treatment with respect were generally found to shape evaluations of the police. They also allow for comparisons between targeted groups and non-targeted groups, and thereby enable an assessment of whether being targeted by police changes the way in which a population judges police behavior. It also enables an assessment of whether being targeted for crime control has different effects from being targeted for counterterrorism ends.
For both the targeted group in crime control (African American minorities) and the targeted group for counterterrorism (Muslims), neutrality was the most important factor shaping police evaluations; respect was second; and trust was third. there do not appear to be any major or systematic differences between Muslims; White non-Muslims; and minority non-Muslims.
VII. Discussion
This paper addresses three issues: whether the procedural justice model can be generalized to new populations within the U.S. and new policing functions; the sensitivity of non-targeted groups to actions taken toward others; and the aspects of police behavior that correlate to judgments about procedural justice in different populations and across different policing issues.
A. Generalizing the procedural justice model beyond crime control
The data presented in this study was drawn from four surveys of diverse populations affected in different ways by old and new policing functions. The data involved a new, minority population that has not been studied before. It addressed a post-9/11 policing function that has not been well understood. Despite these differences, both aspects of the procedural justice mechanism that have been identified in past studies were found to operate in all of the four studies. Indeed, there is no evidence that procedural In sum, even though terrorism is generally perceived as presenting greater potential harms than ordinary crime (Stuntz, 2002) The study finds support for the claim that people do attend to the abuse of other groups' rights in both ordinary times and also when faced with unusually grave threats. In the context of ordinary crime, members of majority groups that are not targeted for heightened policing nonetheless respond to perceived discrimination against minorities by evincing less willingness to cooperate with police. This spillover effect, previously observed with respect to ordinary crime control (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004) , is also observed in the counterterrorism context. This suggests that the police lose legitimacy in the larger community when they engage in unfair tactics directed at one subgroup but generally viewed as being unfair by the entire population.
Moreover, the findings suggest that Muslim and non-Muslim respondents perceive and evaluate the frequency of police counterterrorism intrusions in similar terms. Spillover effects are thus not attributable to different assessments of the frequency or effects of policing measures. While non-Muslims are less likely to be targeted for such terrorism efforts, both groups react negatively to public police intrusions by lowering their assessments of police procedural justice and legitimacy. Both groups react most strongly to public intrusions, and less strongly to private intrusions.
Interestingly, the non-Muslim respondents in the study distinguished between heightened police suspicion on the one hand, and discriminatory actions or harassment on the other hand. Thus, a majority population belief that police view Muslims as a more risky group does not create spillover effects, but a majority population belief that police harass or discriminate does. One way to interpret this finding is as evidence that the the non-Muslim majority believes that the value of providing equal treatment to religious minorities is greater than the value of using perceived statistical regularities (i. How do these findings fit alongside the well-known history of disproportionate targeting of minorities in times of crisis? One hypothesis is that even though public support for profiling and disproportionate attention to minorities may rise in times of heightened threat, people nevertheless remain aware that the tactics that police adopt in response are unfair and respond negatively to police that accede to popular pressures to profile, discriminate, and harass. That is, this data suggests that the public remains aware of the unfairness of certain policing methods even when demand for such measures is perceived to rise.
C. Procedural elements shaping evaluations of procedural justice and legitimacy.
Prior studies suggest that White and minority respondents in the United States generally have similar models for defining procedural justice in the context of ordinary crime (Tyler 2005 ). This analysis extends this prior effort in two ways: by considering Muslim-Americans and by examining reactions to policing against terrorism. Despite this extension, the results are similar in suggesting that three elements of procedural justiceneutrality in decision making, trust in the motives of the police, and treatment with respect --remain central to the definition of procedural justice and its effect on legitimacy. This result holds in both the crime control and the counterterrorism contexts.
Neither the kind of violent threat nor the identity of the respondents changes the basic behavioral predicates of procedural justice.
This finding is cause for optimism. It suggests policing strategy and tactics can be generalized and do not need to be tailored to a particular population or task. That result is consistent with earlier studies of crime control based upon a study of police-citizen encounters in Oakland and Los Angeles (Tyler & Huo, 2002) . Further, the outlines of that general strategy are also clear from previous research (see , for a discussion of general implications for policing). This research suggests that police training and organization can usefully incorporate benchmarks and practices of procedural justice as a means to more successful order-maintenance.
Conclusion
Procedural justice mechanisms provide a robust and broadly applicable framework for predicting public cooperation with law enforcement. Rather than attempting to impress the public with the seriousness of a threat, or showing responsiveness by channeling resources toward minority groups, police better secure public cooperation by behaving with procedural justice toward all groups. This is the case, counterintuitively, for both the minority group being targeted and also for the non- .07 #The Muslim attribute variables and demographics were not found to significantly influence this dependent variable.
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Appendix A. Samples
All of the surveys were conducted by Abt SRBI. This research was conducted with support from the National Institute for Justice; the Law and Social Science program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF0751874) and a grant from the the Open Society Institute. General population. General population of New York City interviewed about crime (n = 1,653). This study was conducted in the summer of 2002. It is based upon a stratified random sample of the residents of New York City interviewed in English or Spanish over the telephone. The sample was 25% Hispanic; 28% White; 34% African-American; and 13% other. The median age category was 35-54 and 46% were male. Fifty-four percent made over $40,000 and 44% were college graduates or more. The response rate was 64%. Of the 13% "other" 60 respondents (4%) reported that they were from countries that might suggest they were Muslim (for example, Pakistan). However, religion was not asked.
General population of New York City interviewed about terrorism (n = 200).
The mean age of the same was 52 and 48 percent were male. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. The sample was 18% Hispanic; 46% White; 31% African-American and 5% other. Sixty-one percent made over $40,000 a year and 46% were college graduates or more. Sixty-seven percent were born in the United States and the respondents had lived an average of 6.59 years outside the US. Of the people interviewed 5 self-reported as Hindi/Muslim in the religion category (3%). These people were included as minority respondents.
The response rate for non-Muslim interviews about terrorism was 23%. This is a relatively low response rate in comparison to the other surveys. It occurred because of an atypically large number of partial non-completes. We believe this was due to the respondent's lack of knowledge about and interest in anti-terror policing activities which were generally not directed at them. For example, asking respondents whether they would report terrorists living next door or would report people sending money to Muslim organizations was less relevant to non-Muslims. Fortunately the percentage of college graduates in both general New York city samples is very similar (46% versus 44% for the general population sample) suggesting that those who did complete the terror survey were similar to those in the larger sample of people interviewed about crime.
Muslims.
The sample of Muslims was not based upon random digit dialing because of the difficulty of finding members of this population. Instead, a sample was created using a multipart approach. First, the proportion of Muslims in each areas of the city was estimated based upon 2000 census tract information about the percentage of the population within each census tract that reported Muslim ancestry, was born in a Muslim country, or spoke a principal language of that country and about the number of mosques. These four variables were summed into a scale and then used to distinguish four levels of Muslim population based on the projected Muslim American proportion from each geographical area. A list was then acquired of known Muslim American households from list sample provider Experian. That list was sampled from in proportion to the estimated Muslim-American population in each geographical area.
Each household was approached by telephone. Only land lines were used, but statistical adjustments were made for the number of land and cell phone numbers in the home. Homes were called back 10 times. If contact was made a randomly selected person was interviewed. Interviews were conducted in English, Bengali, Urdu or Arabic.
Muslim-Americans in New York City interviewed about terrorism (n = 300). The response rate was 47%. The mean age of the same was 38 and 47 percent were male. Most interviews were conducted in English (73%), with other interviews conducted in Arabic, Bengali and Urdu. Of those interviewed 19% were born in the United States. On average the sample had spent 18 years living outside the United States. Fifty two percent were college graduates and 54% made over $40,000 a year.
Muslim-Americans in New York City interviewed about crime (n = 200). The response rate was 43%. The mean age of the same was 42 and 48 percent were male. Most interviews were conducted in English (77 %), with other interviews conducted in Arabic, Bengali and Urdu. Of those interviewed 13% were born in the United States. On average the sample had spent 20 years living outside the United States. Fifty one percent were college graduates and 53% made over $40,000 a year.
Trust. Respondents were asked: How often do the police: "Consider people's views when deciding what to do" and "Take account of the needs and concerns of the people they deal with".
Respectful treatment. Respondents were asked: How often do the police: "Respect people's rights" and "Treat people with dignity and respect".
Effectiveness. Respondents were asked: How effective are the police in your neighborhood at helping people who ask them for help?
Deterrence. Respondents were asked: How likely are people to be caught and punished for breaking the following laws: "Park their cars illegally"; "Dispose of their trash or litter illegally"; "Make too much noise at night"; "Break a traffic law"; "Buy stolen goods on the street"; "Take inexpensive items from stores without paying" and "Use marijuana in a public place".
Muslim attributes. Proportion of life lived outside US. This variable reflects the ratio of years lived outside the United States to age.
Region of origin. There were two large groups of Muslims. One group was from South Asia (Bangladesh; Pakistan; India; Sri Lanka) and the other from the Middle East (Egypt; Jordon: Yemen: Palestine). These two concentrations were represented by dummy variables for region.
English in home. Respondents were asked whether English was the primary language spoken in their home; whether it was sometimes spoken; or whether it was seldom or never spoken.
Muslim identification. Two questions were asked to form the scale (alpha = 0.83). First, "how important is religion in your daily life". Second, "how strongly do you identify as a Muslim"?
Demographics. Respondents were asked their age; their family income; and their level of education. Gender was coded by the interviewer.
Non-Muslims and crime
Alert the police. Respondents were asked: How likely would you be to: "Call the police to report a crime occurring in your neighborhood"; "Help the police to find someone suspected of committing a crime by providing them with information"; and "Report dangerous or suspicious activities in your neighborhood".
Cooperate. Respondents were asked: How likely would you be to: "Volunteer your time on nights or weekends to help the police in your community'; "Patrol the streets as part of a neighborhood watch program" and "Attend a community meeting to discuss crime in your community".
Legitimacy. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree that: "The NYPD is a legitimate authority and people should obey the decisions that officers make"; "I have confidence that the NYPD can do its job well"; "I trust the leaders of the NYPD to make decisions that are good for everyone in the city"; "People's basic rights are well protected by the police"; "You should accept the decisions made by police, even if you think they are wrong"; and "You should do what the police tell you to do even when you don't like the way they treat you."
Procedural justice--implementation. This overall scale combines five subscales: procedural justice; voice, neutrality, trust and treatment with respect. terrorist attack"; "A person visiting an internet chat room or web site in which there is material posted that supports al Qaeda"; "A person giving money to organizations that people say are associated with terrorists"; "A person talking about traveling overseas to fight for Muslims"; and "A person distributing material expressing support for al Qaeda". The scale was constructed by combining these two sets of items multiplicatively.
Legitimacy. A six item scale was constructed. Respondents were asked to indicate their views concerning the local and national law enforcement agents engaged in activities related to the threat of terrorism. The items were: "These law enforcement agents are legitimate authorities and you should obey their decisions"; "You should accept the decisions made by these law enforcement agents, even when you disagree with them"; "It is our duty to obey all law enforcement agents, even when we do not like the way that they treat us"; "These agents generally treat all people with dignity and respect when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism"; "You trust these law enforcement agents to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism"; and "People's rights are generally well protected by these law enforcement agents when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism".
Procedural justice in policy formation. Respondents were asked how much the government cared about their views when "making decisions about what actions to take to address the threat of terrorism" and when "dealing with complaints about how antiterrorism tactics affect them". They were also asked how often the government "convened meetings in your neighborhood to hear about community concerns about how law enforcement should deal with the threat of terrorism".
Procedural justice in policy implementation. The overall scale was created by combining five scales: procedural justice, voice, neutrality, trust and treatment with respect.
Procedural justice. Respondents were asked: When law enforcement agents are dealing with people like yourself concerning issues of terrorism, how fair are they in terms of: "the procedures they use to handle the problems they deal with" and "how they treat people"
Voice. Respondents were asked one item: How often do law enforcement agents. "Give people a chance to express their views before making decisions".
Neutrality. Respondents were asked: How often do law enforcement agents. The items were: "accurately understand and apply the law"; "Make their decisions based upon facts, not their personal opinions"; and "Apply the law consistently to everyone, regardless of who they are".
Trust in authorities. Respondents were asked two items: How often do law enforcement agents. "Consider people's views when deciding what to do"; and "Take account of the needs and concerns of the people they deal with" Treatment with respect. Respondents were asked: How often do law enforcement agents: "Respect people's rights"; and "Treat people with dignity and respect"
Terror threat. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree that: "There is a serious risk of a major terrorist attack in the United States at this time".
The police help you feel safe. Respondents were asked: "How good of a job have law enforcement agents done in terms of making you feel safe from the threat of terrorism?". 
